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Modeling the Effects of Area Closure
and Tax Policies:  A Spatial-Temporal





Abstract  We develop an economic model for a multi-species fishery that incor-
porates the spatial and temporal distribution of effort and fish stocks.
Catchability coefficients and initial stocks are estimated from catch and effort
data for each specific location. Vessels are allocated over space and time to lo-
cations of maximum profit, which decline with harvest because of stock
externalities. A supply function for labor allocation in the fishery is estimated.
The simulated model is applied to the Hawaii longline fishery. The economic im-
pacts of regulatory policies, such as reduction of inshore gear conflict and
conservation of offshore turtle populations, are examined.
Key words  Area closures, harvest taxes, longline fisheries, regulation, spatial-
temporal models.
Introduction
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) have been heralded by many fishery econo-
mists as the panacea for the management problems that beset most of the world’s
fish stocks. In a comprehensive review of the regulatory experience with ITQs,
Squires, Kirkley, and Tisdell (1995) suggest that many countries have preferred in-
put controls to ITQs in fisheries with multiple species and bycatch problems, as well
as in situations where the costs of monitoring, enforcement, and resource assessment
are significant. Other “second best” management measures, such as area closures
and gear restrictions, have been adopted in more complex fisheries in several coun-
tries such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy. Area and seasonal closures
have also been popular in the management of migratory species, such as tuna in the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Gribble and Dredge 1994).
There is a large body of literature (see survey by Townsend 1990) that examines
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the economic and biological impacts of alternative regulatory policies, such as
ITQs, and various forms of limited entry programs (e.g., gear restrictions). Most
published studies have either focused on a single regulatory instrument, such as a
quota on harvest or gear restriction, or a combination (Moussali and Hilborn 1986;
Stollery 1984). Other analyses have attempted to endogenize the length and timing
of closures in a programming model of stock recruitment (Watson, Die, and
Restrepo 1993). These models, by and large, implicitly assume away substitution ef-
fects of area closures; i.e., when a certain fishing ground is closed, effort may be
reallocated elsewhere. Several studies suggest that these substitution effects may be
quite significant. For example, Cadrin et al. (1995) point out that when stocks are
migratory, closure of inshore areas to more efficient vessels, “may not confer the ex-
pected benefits because fishing effort will be displaced to unprotected areas.” Clo-
sure of inshore fishing areas led to increased allocation of effort to onshore fishing
grounds in the Gulf of Mexico brown shrimp fishery (Gracia 1997). Very recently,
lawyers for the Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, concerned about turtle bycatches
in the North Pacific, successfully argued that substitution of boats to other regions
will minimize the welfare impacts of a moratorium on fish harvests in the North Ha-
waiian Ocean. As a result, U.S. District Judge David Ezra took the “unprecedented”
step of restricting Hawaii longliners from fishing north of 28 degrees latitude
(TenBruggencate 1999).
In what follows, we examine the economic impacts of area closure and tax poli-
cies by developing a model which explicitly incorporates both the spatial and dy-
namic elements. The model has several unique features that include: (i) estimation
of the catch-abundance relationship for a multi-species fishery by spatial location;
(ii) sequential allocation of vessels over a spatial grid using a crew-profit maximiz-
ing criterion; and (iii) estimation of a labor supply function based on the labor-lei-
sure tradeoff. The model is applied to the spatial and dynamic allocation of longline
vessels in the Hawaii pelagic fishery. Model results are found to predict actual ves-
sel allocation data reasonably accurately. The model is then used to generate eco-
nomic impacts under alternative area closure restrictions and tax policies.
The differential impact of area closure policies that reduce inshore gear conflict
and turtle bycatch in offshore fisheries is compared with an increase in the tax on
harvest. It is found that harvest taxes have a minimal effect in achieving conserva-
tion objectives relative to area closures. An increase in the harvest tax would have a
small effect on the reduction of aggregate fishing effort and catch, but would signifi-
cantly reduce crew wages and boat owner incomes. Area closure policies that reduce
turtle bycatch in the northern latitudes also block access to lucrative swordfish fish-
ing grounds, but they have a relatively small impact on vessel profits. This is be-
cause boats are able to switch to inshore fishing areas. Policies that reduce gear con-
flict in inshore areas have the smallest impact on crew income and result in reduced
harvests of the major inshore species.
While the individual elements of the proposed model are not novel, we believe
that the inclusion of a spatially, non-uniform distribution of fish stocks and harvest-
ing costs in obtaining the equilibrium allocation of vessels over time and space
helps develop a modeling framework which is powerful in predictive capacity and
policy analysis. The spatial feature allows for differential accounting of vessel travel
costs from port and fishing costs by location. The dynamic nature of the model al-
lows for stock externalities and exogenous changes in demand and cost parameters.
In the longer term, discounting can be easily incorporated. In future work, biological
information on the spatial migration of pelagic fish stocks can be included to deter-
mine instantaneous fish stocks net of harvest and migration. Extension to multiple
ports of origin and political jurisdictions is straightforward.
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tion of the model using data from the Hawaii pelagic fishery is then described. This
is followed by a demonstration of the model application by examining impacts of
regulatory policy changes. Finally, a conclusion summarizes the paper.
The Model
The model is based on a standard framework of maximization of fleet profit by risk-
neutral fishermen in the short run, where the allocation of fishing effort is deter-
mined over space based on the comparison of net revenues from each fishing loca-
tion. The fishery can be thought of as a regulated open-access fishery, where sea-
sonal closures are used to achieve regulatory objectives, such as species and bycatch
conservation. Net revenues, in turn, are dependent on stock sizes of each species and
allocated fishing effort in fishing locations, as well as exogenous fish price and
catchability of each species. Price and various stock sizes across fishing regions in
each period influence the fleet revenue per trip, while the distance between the har-
bor and each fishing area affect travel costs. Fishing sets are divided according to
the primary target (e.g., tuna or swordfish) as explained below, which, in turn, af-
fects the catchability of different species as well as fishing costs per set. Thus, the
choice of set types within a trip also influences the trip’s profitability. As more trips
are allocated into a particular fishing area, the expected revenue per trip from the
area (and the net return) diminishes due to the stock externality. In equilibrium, the
average net returns per trip are equalized across locations.
Catch Function
Consider a fishery in which there are I species of fish (e.g., swordfish, bigeye, and
yellowfin) denoted by i = 1, ..., I and K fishing areas or locations, indexed by k = 1,
..., K. Stocks of different species are assumed to be known at the beginning of a
given time period in each area. These time periods are chosen to be sufficiently
short, such that in each area stock changes within a period due to fish reproduction,
natural mortality, and stock migration across areas can be ignored; i.e., fish stocks
within a period are expected to decrease only due to harvesting.
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where Bi,k and (1 – e–f) are the respective fish stock and fishing mortality rate for
species i in area k. As specified in equation (1), the fishing mortality rate is an in-
creasing function of fishing effort expended in area k and exhibits diminishing mar-
ginal returns. Note that the fishing mortality rate must, by definition, be confined to
the unit interval and is always less than unity. We also assume that the fish stock is
“infinitely diffusive” within area k; i.e., the density of fish is linearly related to the
residual stock size and is distributed uniformly within each fishing area (Clark
1985). γ i is a vector of the catchability coefficient for species i, Ek is a vector of fish-
ing effort (e.g., number of hooks) in area k, and Bi,k is the fish stock for species i in
area k. In equation (1), f is defined as a linear sum of effort by set types:
fE E k ii s
s
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where s represents alternative set types (e.g., targeting tuna or swordfish), γ i,s and
Ek,s are the catchability coefficient and the amount of fishing effort by set type s, re-
spectively. Later in the empirical model, we define one unit of fishing effort as
1,000 hooks. Vessel trips need to be differentiated by whether they target swordfish
or tuna (or both), since the cost structure and the catchability vary depending on the
species targeted during the trip. A slightly more generalized form of equation (1) has
been used by Clark (1985) and Deacon (1989), although they do not consider het-
erogeneity in the targeting of species.
Revenue from a Fishing Trip
We assume that ex-vessel fish prices are given. Although not attempted here, a de-
mand function for each species can be substituted at the cost of additional model
complexity. Implicitly, we assume that each boat has perfect knowledge of the fish
stock in area k. Then the total revenue from fishing in area k is obtained by summing
over revenues from each species. The average revenue per trip in area k, ARTrip,k, can
























where Pi is the price of species I, and Nk denotes the total number of fishing trips to
area k per unit time period. It is easy to see from equation (3) that average revenue
will increase with fish prices and initial stock, and decrease with the number of
trips.
We assume that all boats that target the same species (tuna or swordfish) are
identical and that once the boat reaches a fishing location k, they each conduct the
same number of fishing sets over an equal number of days, and expend the same
fishing effort for each set type. The assumption of identical effort across boats tar-
geting tuna or swordfish may be reasonable for an industry with homogeneous gear
(e.g., longliners), in which most boats would have roughly similar storage capacity
for bait and harvested fish. Second, the time spent fishing may be limited since the
quality of the freshly harvested fish on board begins to decline rapidly with time.
Let FD denote the number of fishing days per trip. Since each boat can change
types (e.g., targeting swordfish or tuna) during a single trip, FD = Σ s FDk,s, where
FDk,s is the number of days a boat is of type s per trip in area k. It implies that the
number of days a boat chooses to target tuna or swordfish may vary, but the total
number of fishing days per trip is fixed. The allocation of set type within a trip is a
choice variable. Let  Es denote the amount of fishing effort by set type s, which is
constant. Then, the aggregate amount of fishing effort in area k by set type s, is:
E E FD N ks s ks k ,, ≡⋅ ⋅ (4)
Cost Structure and Crew Wage
We incorporate features of the labor-employment relation that have a bearing on ap-
portioning of revenue and costs from fishing (Plourde and Smith 1989). For this pur-
pose, we classify the costs of fishing into two categories: fixed and variable (i.e.,Modeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 183
operational) costs. In the share system that is prevalent in the Hawaii longline fish-
ery (Hamilton, Curtis, and Travis 1996), fixed costs are usually borne by the vessel
owner and consist of overhead expenses (e.g., maintenance, mooring, and deprecia-
tion charges), which do not depend directly on the fishing trip and are more or less
fixed on an annual basis. Therefore, we assume that fixed costs do not affect the trip
allocation decision in our short-run model.
The variable costs are the expenses incurred during the fishing trip (e.g., fuel,
bait, and gear). This can be further broken down into costs incurred while traveling
to area k and fishing in that location. We assume away travel costs within area k,
which may be reasonable because they are likely to be a small fraction of the costs
of traveling from port. For simplicity, each trip involves direct travel to the chosen
destination and return to port; i.e., fishing in multiple areas within the same trip is
not allowed. Multiple locations will complicate the computation of travel costs and
will necessitate making assumptions about the sequence of fishing locations within
the same trip. Consultations with fishery economists (e.g., Pooley 2000) suggest that
it is quite possible that vessels move around within a given area k, which by itself is
an “artificial” construct. If that happens, the model is a good enough approximation,
except that we are not taking into account the additional travel costs. It is perhaps
unlikely that lots of vessels move across regions in a single trip. On the other hand,
returning boats could be picking up additional catches during their trip to the port,
and we do not consider it in our model. Future extensions of the model could in-
clude multiple fishing locations within a single trip.
Taxes on the harvest are included as a percentage of the total revenue from a
trip. Variable costs, including taxes, are shared equally by the owner and crew. The
owner is usually absentee, while we denote all hands on board, including the cap-
tain, as crew. The net revenue from a trip to area k, NRk is then given by:
NR AR a FD b TD k Trip k s ks
s
k =− − ⋅ + ⋅ 


 ∑ ,, () 1 τ (5)
where τ  denotes the tax rate; cost parameters as and b represent the average daily
variable costs of fishing with set type s and traveling, respectively; and TDk is the
number of days spent in traveling from port to destination k and back. As mentioned
before, since all boats spend an equal number of fishing days per trip, the total num-
ber of fishing days per trip, FD, is equal across trips. On the other hand, the number
of travel days, TDk, can be estimated by dividing twice the distance to area k from
port by average vessel speed.
The incomes accruing to the vessel owner and crew from a trip to area k are
given by:
OI NR kk =−⋅ () 1 λ (6)
and
CI NR kk =⋅ λ (7)
where OIk and CIk and (1 – λ ) and λ  denote the respective incomes and relative
shares of net revenue accruing to the owner and crew.
The crew income from a trip in equation (7) or the crew wage per day, which is
the crew income divided by the total number of trip days, may be used as a measure
of wage. However, both indicators may be biased when comparing wages acrossChakravorty and Nemoto 184
fishing areas due to the variation in the distance of the fishing location from port.
We remove this bias by normalizing wages with respect to distance employing a
procedure detailed in Appendix 1, which yields NCWk, the normalized crew wage
for a trip to area k. Finally, let NCW denote the weighted average normalized crew












Finally, labor allocation per period in the fishery, measured in vessel-days, is obtained
by summing both fishing and traveling days over all trips to all fishing areas as:
VD FD TD N k
k
k =+ ∑ () (9)
where VD is the aggregate amount of labor allocation in vessel-days per time period.
Given exogenous fish prices, a derived demand function for labor is obtained
through optimal allocation of vessel trips over space. Since vessels are assumed
identical in every respect, it is straightforward to distribute the representative vessel
trip spatially starting from the fishing location that yields the maximum normalized
crew wage to the crew (i.e., NCWk). Note that the allocation of sets (tuna and sword-
fish) within each trip is endogenous. As vessels get assigned to locations generating
maximum normalized crew wage, subsequent harvests in that location decline be-
cause of stock externality. Other competing fishing locations become more profit-
able. Thus, as the aggregate number of trips—all of which consist of an equal num-
ber of fishing (though not travel) days—increases, the marginal, and hence, the av-
erage, trip wage decreases. Because of the discrete nature of the problem of allocat-
ing a fixed number of vessel trips, the equilibrium normalized crew wage will only
be approximately equal across locations. In a model where the number of boats is
infinitely divisible, NCWk and NCW are exactly equal. A plot of the normalized
wage index as a function of the aggregate amount of vessel-days yields a downward-
sloping derived demand function for labor. Note that this demand function may shift
in response to changes in fish prices or the initial distribution of the fish stock.
Labor Supply and Equilibrium Allocation of Trips over Space
The fishing industry is ideally suited for modeling the labor supply behavior of fish-
ermen. This is because most fishermen are self-employed, and boat captains gener-
ally have the power to decide if, when, and where to undertake a fishing trip. Fur-
thermore, as pointed out by Gautam, Strand, and Kirkley (1996), unlike other pro-
fessions in which labor and leisure activities coexist almost on a daily basis, com-
mercial fishing in the high seas is demanding work coupled with limited leisure op-
portunities. This makes the disutility of spending another day fishing or staying at
sea an important determinant of the labor supply decision. Assuming a fixed number
of fishing vessels, the aggregate labor supply function can be expressed as:
VD S NCW M L = (, ) (10)
where M is income from non-fishing activities. Labor supplied by the crew (includ-Modeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 185
ing captain) is expected to increase with the normalized crew wage, NCW, and it
may, in the short-run exhibit backward-bending properties (as in Gautam, Strand,
and Kirkley 1996). In general, non-fishery income M may affect the labor-leisure
substitution. However, for commercial fisheries as considered here, M may be rela-
tively small, and in any case it is difficult to obtain data for non-fishery income
earned by fishermen. It is, therefore, ignored in the empirical estimation.
In order to econometrically estimate the labor supply function in equation (10),
we obtain NCW and VD using actual data (Kennedy 1992). That is, the actual num-
bers of catches and vessel trips to area k are used in equation (3) as compared to the
use of equations (1–9) in the calculation of the derived demand function obtained
from stock and price data. The derived demand function for labor is expected to
shift in response to changes in fish prices or the distribution of fish stocks, while the
labor supply function remains constant across periods. Finally, the equilibrium lev-
els of NCW and VD are obtained by equating the derived labor demand with the esti-
mated labor supply function from equation (10).
Application to the Hawaii Longline Fishery
In this section, we apply the above model to the Hawaii longline pelagic fishery.
The Hawaii commercial fishery has grown rapidly since 1987, with annual commer-
cial value estimated at roughly $60 million (WPRFMC 1997). Longline vessels ac-
count for more than 80% of gross revenue, the remaining being from baitboat (pole-
and-line skipjack), handline, and trolling. For the purposes of this study, we only
deal with longline vessels, which are reasonably homogenous in terms of fishing
technology and other vessel characteristics. The major species targeted by the
longline fishery are broadbill swordfish and bigeye tuna (He, Bigelow, and Boggs
1997), while yellowfin and albacore tunas and striped marlin also represent a sig-
nificant share of the total ex-vessel revenue. Together, these five species accounted
for approximately 90% of gross revenue in 1995.
We construct a spatial grid that divides the fishery into 56 five-by-five degree
(latitude and longitude) squares centered in the Main Hawaiian Islands (MHI).
These areas are located between latitude 5° N to 45° N and longitude 140° W to
170° E. Each five-degree square is defined using its southeast corner as the reference
point; e.g., the square between latitudes 15°  and 20° N and longitudes 140°  and
145° W is labeled as 15N140W, as per a classification system developed by Curran,
Boggs, and He (1996).
Catch and fishing effort data from the 1995 longline logbook, collected by the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (Dollar and Yoshimoto 1991) are aggre-
gated by five-by-five degree squares and by month. The data suggests that 1,125
trips (corresponding to 11,129 sets and about 13.3 million hooks) were taken by 110
active longline vessels in 1995 (WPRFMC 1997). That is, on average each longline
fishing trip lays approximately 10 sets—one set each fishing day.
Swordfish vs. Tuna Sets
One complication that needs to be considered in empirical work is the targeting
strategy of the vessel. Each boat can target swordfish or tuna (bigeye and yellowfin)
on any given fishing day, while the remaining two species, albacore and striped mar-
lin, are caught mainly as bycatch. Targeting these different species imposes distinct
fishing and cost characteristics on the boat. For example, swordfish sets are soaked
overnight and they use more expensive bait (squid) and other devices (lightsticks).Chakravorty and Nemoto 186
Tuna sets are soaked in daylight, and use cheaper samma (saury, Cololabis saira) as
bait. The catchability coefficients [from equation (1)] would be different for each
set, since swordfish (tuna) targeting would lead to bigger swordfish (tuna) catches,
ceteris paribus. Allocation of sets is done by inspecting logbook data and designating
each set as swordfish or tuna set depending on whether they satisfy the above qualitative
criteria. About 11% of the sets did not fall clearly into any category; e.g., a set that
soaked in the night, used squid as bait, but did not use any lightsticks. These were
allocated by looking at which of the above criteria they matched more closely.
Given the two fishing strategies or set types, the specification of the function f
in equation (2) can be simplified as:
fE E E k ii k i k (,) γγ γ =+ 1 1 2 2 (11)
where subscripts 1 and 2 denote tuna and swordfish sets, respectively. Since the av-
erage number of hooks used in a swordfish set (820) was different from a tuna set
(1,498), the fishing effort levels in area k by type 1 and 2 can be expressed from
equation (4) as Ek1 = 1.498 FDk1 · Nk and Ek2 = 0.820 FDk2 · Nk. Here (FDk1 · Nk) and
(FDk2 · Nk) represent the total number of tuna and swordfish sets conducted in area k,
and FDk1 + FDk2 = 10 since the sum of swordfish and tuna sets per trip must equal
the total fishing days, and we define one unit of fishing effort as 1,000 hooks.
Estimating Catchability Coefficients and Fish Stocks
Given the two distinct fishing strategies, two sets of catchability coefficients for
each species (i.e., for tuna and swordfish sets) are estimated from monthly catch and
effort data, details for which are given in Appendix 2. The results are summarized in
table 1. The catchability for swordfish with a tuna set was very low (0.0002), which
implies that a tuna set catches very few swordfish. Also, for a given stock size and
unit effort, a swordfish set catches 22 times more swordfish than a tuna set. The
table also suggests that a swordfish set catches more bigeye and yellowfin tunas
than even a tuna set, although fishermen may actually prefer to catch these tunas us-
ing the cheaper cost of a tuna set. Catches of albacore and striped marlin were
higher from tuna sets than from swordfish sets. These results are very similar to that
of Okamoto (1999).
The catchability coefficients for the five major species, as well as monthly ef-
fort and catch data, are used to estimate the initial size of the monthly fish stock Bi,k
in each location from equation (1). That is, the estimated fish stock (population of
species i in location k) is assumed to be “in place” at the beginning of each month,
Table 1
Estimation Results for Catchability Coefficients by Species and by Fishing Strategies
Catchability Coefficient
Catchability
Tuna Set Swordfish Set Ratio
Species (γ i1)( γ i2)( γ i2/γ i1)
Swordfish 0.00022 0.00483 22.453
Bigeye tuna 0.00338 0.00738 2.181
Yellowfin tuna 0.00378 0.01224 3.237
Albacore tuna 0.00431 0.00058 0.135
Striped marlin 0.00248 0.00195 0.788Modeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 187
Figure 1.  Average Monthly Fish Prices ($/fish)
but depletes with harvesting as trips are allocated at each location. A new stock is
estimated at the beginning of each month. In one sense, the model simplifies the in-
flow and outflow of fish migration in each grid by assuming that migration could
only occur instantaneously at the point of transition between successive time peri-
ods; i.e., at the beginning of each calendar month. Notice that a calendar month is
only an arbitrary device, and the model could be built with weekly price, catch, and
effort data, if available, although allocation of trips that usually last longer than a
week may be problematic.
Expected Revenue from a Trip
Monthly fish prices are assumed to be exogenously determined, since most fish is
sold in markets in Japan and the U.S. mainland (WPRFMC 1995). Prices were com-
puted using revenue data for each species collected by the Hawaii Department of
Agriculture and Resources (HDAR 1995). Catch data is in terms of numbers of fish
caught, and fish prices are in dollars per standard-sized fish, as shown in figure 1.
Using equation (3), expected revenue in each location was computed from fish
prices and estimated stocks. Since the aggregate revenue from the five major species
was 92.82% of the total revenue reported in 1995, a correction factor of 1.0774 was
applied to account for other minor species and side catches.
Variable Costs of Fishing
As mentioned earlier, we ignore fixed costs of fishing and focus only on variable
costs and taxes. In Hawaii, longliners are legally obliged to sell their catch to the
United Fishing Agency Ltd., which charges each vessel an auction fee equal to 10%Chakravorty and Nemoto 188
of the total revenue from a fishing trip. The excise tax rate is an additional 0.5% of
the total revenue. Both the auction fee and the excise tax are shared equally between
the owner and crew and are a fixed proportion of gross trip revenue (Hamilton,
Curtis, and Travis 1996).
Variable costs, including the cost of food, oil, fuel, bait, lightsticks, ice, and
miscellaneous gear, can be broken down according to their relationship to fishing or
traveling activity. Food, oil, and fuel are consumed for both, while expenses on bait,
lightsticks, ice, and miscellaneous fishing gear occur only during fishing. That is, the
cost of a fishing day is much higher than the cost of a travel day. Table 2 details the
breakdown of the variable costs. Based on the survey by Hamilton, Curtis, and Travis
(1996), the average daily costs for food and oil are $81.54 and $9.41, respectively.
The cost of fuel, is on average, higher on a travel day ($250.56) than on a fishing
day ($219.11). The variable cost per travel day is $341.51 as shown in the table.
Another complication in the calculation of variable costs is the higher expense
of targeting swordfish relative to the tuna species (i.e., bigeye and yellowfin). The
variable cost of fishing depends on a vessel’s targeting strategy. It is likely to be
higher for targeting swordfish and lower for targeting (bigeye) tuna, due to more ex-
pensive bait, lightsticks, and miscellaneous gear in the former. Specifically, the av-
erage variable cost per fishing day depends on the proportion of swordfish-targeted
sets in the 10 sets per fishing trip. As indicated in table 2, the cost of a fishing day is
much higher than the cost of a travel day, and swordfish fishing is almost thrice as
expensive ($2,062.61) as tuna fishing ($779.84). This yields the following formula
for variable costs for a trip to area k:
VC r TD ks w k k =+× × + × (. . ) . , 779 84 1282 77 10 341 51 (12)
where rsw,k is the share of swordfish sets in the total. The above equation implies that
the variable costs per trip will increase about $1,283 by substituting a swordfish set
for a tuna set.
Table 2
Estimated Average Daily Variable Costs ($/day)
Fishing Day
Items Tuna Set Swordfish Set Travel Day
Food 81.54 81.54 81.54
Oil 9.41 9.41 9.41




Misc. gear 111.40 531.90
Total 779.84 2,062.61 341.51
Source:  Hamilton, Curtis, and Travis (1996).
a In their survey, 37 out of 94 vessels surveyed found no fuel cost differentials between fishing and
travel days, 9 reported higher fuel costs for fishing days, and the remaining 48 vessels reported higher
fuel costs for travel days. The average fuel cost was $219.11 per fishing day and $250.56 per travel day.Modeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 189
Net Return and Normalized Crew Wage







































where 0.105 is the total share of revenue paid out as auction fee (10%) and excise
tax (0.5%), and 0.2803 is the ratio of wages from a travel day relative to a fishing
day (see Appendix 1), and the vessel owner and crew each collect 50% of the re-
sidual profit (i.e., λ  = 0.50)—more than 95% of Hawaii-based longline vessels fol-
low the equal sharing rule (Hamilton, Curtis, and Travis 1996). These equations
yield the derived demand for labor, as explained in the previous section.
Estimation of Labor Supply
To get the supply function, the monthly total revenue from trips to area k was esti-
mated using actual catch data, by region, from the 1995 longline logbook. Unfortu-
nately, the logbook data available to us does not reveal the number of trips made by
vessels to a specific location, only the total numbers of sets and hooks placed in
each square by month. Since we assume that exactly 10 sets must be conducted in a
single fishing location within a trip, dividing the total number of sets placed in each
square by 10 yields the “actual” number of trips. The number of vessel-days, com-
puted from equation (9), was aggregated by month and summarized in table 3. The
annual number of trips approximated was 1,165, somewhat larger than the 1,125 to-
tal longline trips made in 1995 (WPRFMC 1997). One reason for this overestima-
tion was that vessels tended to conduct more sets during distant-water fishing trips.
Part of the error could also be due to errors in recording of logbook data.
Using a simplified specification of a labor supply function used by Battalio,
Green, and Kagel (1981), the labor supply function was estimated as follows:
ln . (ln ) . (ln ) VD NCW NCW =− 2 2777 0 17178
44 51 21 67
2
               ( . )                     (– . )
(15)
where numbers inside the parentheses are t-ratios. The resulting adjusted R2 and
Durbin-Watson statistic were 0.6627 and 2.3809, respectively. Both parameters were
significant at the 1% level. Since the crew would not go fishing if the expected wage
was not high enough, ln VD ≤  0 when ln NCW = 0, the intercept in equation (15)
should be zero or negative. Because a positive, but insignificant, intercept was ob-
tained in the preliminary estimation, the intercept was restricted to zero. The labor
supply function obtained is illustrated in figure 2. Supply is increasing with NCW
when NCW < $757/day, but it is backward-bending at higher values.Chakravorty and Nemoto 190
Ex-vessel revenues from the five major species shows that the longline industry
earned more than $4 million per month during the first quarter and in December, and
much less during the other months, particularly from July to November. The above
data indicate that the backward-bending supply curve may be reasonable.
Simulating the Hawaii Longline Fishery
The equilibrium allocation of monthly trips that equates demand and supply of labor
for the entire industry is determined using a simulation algorithm written in the pro-
gramming language Turbo C++. Note that there are 12 different demand functions,
since stocks and prices vary by month, but only a single estimated supply function.
Results are only shown in figure 2 for the months of March and August 1995, re-
spectively, when the derived demands for labor are large and small.
Model results for the baseline year 1995 are compared with the actual distribu-
tion of fishing sets in the Hawaii longline fishery, shown in figure 3. In order to in-
vestigate the importance of the leisure-labor tradeoff in the estimation of the supply
function, an alternative model in which there is no income effect on the consump-
tion of leisure (i.e., days on shore) is also presented in the figure. The latter model
ignores the fisherman’s disincentive to supply labor brought on by higher trip
wages. Without this effect, the supply curve is horizontal; that is, fishing trips are
allocated until labor demand is equal to the normalized crew wage computed from
1993 wage data (Hamilton, Curtis, and Travis 1996). As shown in figure 3, the
model without the labor-leisure tradeoff demonstrated poor fitness. For example, the
number of trips allocated was overestimated in the first quarter (particular in March)
when trip revenue is relatively high (table 3) due to higher fish prices and stock
abundance, and underestimated during April to November (no trips were allocated
during August and September) when trip revenue was relatively low. This suggests
that overestimation may have been caused because the disincentive to supply labor
Table 3
Data for Estimating the Fishing Labor Supply
Normalized Total Ex-vessel
Number of Labor Crew Wage Revenue of Longline
Month Fishing Tripsa (vessel-days) ($/day) Industry (million $)
January 99.1 1,687 1,168 4.67
February 99.3 1,913 1,182 5.08
March 102.5 1,861 1,151 5.13
April 104.5 2,003 683 4.07
May 120.3 2,052 569 4.05
June 105.4 1,971 659 3.91
July 87.6 1,604 348 2.55
August 61.3 1,289 170 1.43
September 64.5 1,225 130 1.25
October 90.3 1,382 450 2.21
November 111.7 1,878 464 3.01
December 118.2 2,047 841 4.44
Total 1,164.7 20,913 651 41.81
Source: NMFS longline logbook data (1995).
a Actual aggregated number of sets divided by 10 fishing days per trip.Modeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 191
Figure 2.  Derived Demand (in March and August) and Supply Curves for Labor
Figure 3.  Number of Allocated Fishing Trips, 1995: Actual and Simulated
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when crew wages were high in the first quarter was ignored. This comparison sug-
gests that incorporation of the leisure-labor tradeoff may be significant in modeling
fishermen’s behavior, as suggested by Gautam, Strand, and Kirkley (1996), and
could be explored in more detail in future work.
On the other hand, the model with the labor-leisure tradeoff performs markedly
better in tracking the actual allocation of boats. The Mean Absolute Percentage Er-
ror (MAPE) was 11.4%, while that without the labor-leisure tradeoff was more than
70%. However, gaps between the actual and predicted numbers of trips still remain,
as shown in figure 3. The simulated number of trips is somewhat underestimated
from March to May, and overestimated from September to November.
A large part of the difference can be explained by the difference in fishing loca-
tions and the number of swordfish sets from optimization and the actual spatial dis-
tribution, as shown in table 4. For instance, in March and April, only four trips are
allocated to two fishing regions near the MHI (MHI: 20N155W and 15N155W), al-
though more than 40 trips were allocated in reality. However, relatively more trips are
allocated in other areas, such as north of 30° N. On the other hand, from September
to November, 43 more trips are allocated to the two MHI regions in the simulation,
while 27 less trips are allocated to the regions north of 30° N.
Part of the error may be due to the fact that vessels tend to fish in familiar loca-
tions, not necessarily in those which return maximum profits. There is also the diffi-
culty of estimating catches for each species, as seen in the species-wise breakdown
of actual and simulated catches given in table 5. It shows that the simulated aggre-
gate catches of albacore and striped marlin were higher by 30% and 19%, respec-
tively, although those for swordfish and bigeye were higher by only 1% and lower
by about 10% for yellowfin. One possibility is that fishermen may not be explicitly
incorporating revenues from albacore and striped marlin in their decision-making
process because these are somewhat “undesirable” species, much less valuable than
the other three, and take up scarce storage space in vessels (Kelleher 1997).
Some other factors that may contribute to the difference in results are: (i) the
assumption of identical vessels in terms of cost structure, speed, and other param-
eters, such as the number of lightsticks used per fishing set; (ii) perfect knowledge
about fish prices and stocks in each fishing location; (iii) the assumption of costless
switching between tuna and swordfish sets; and (iv) restriction to one fishing loca-
tion per trip. In particular, certain groups of vessels use only one strategy (tuna or
swordfish) for a long period of time, due to factors such as personal preference and
other vessel-related physical constraints.
Policy Simulation
We use the model to examine the economic impacts of three proposed regulatory
policies: (i) the closure of two, five-by-five degree squares, including the fishing ar-
eas off the MHI to avoid gear conflicts; (ii) closure of all fishing areas north of
30° N for sea turtle conservation; and (iii) increase of auction fee from 10% to 20%
for revenue generation.
Reducing Gear Conflict: Closure of Areas near the Main Hawaiian Islands
(Case 1)
Limited entry restrictions, such as area closure, are particularly appropriate in re-
ducing short-run (or crowding) externalities (Townsend 1990). Several gear types
often compete for the same species of pelagic fish, and the exclusion of a particularModeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 193
gear type would reduce crowding. In Hawaii, longline and surface fleets (trollers
and handliners) have often fished in the same locations, especially within 20 nauti-
cal miles of the shore (Skillman, Boggs, and Pooley 1993). Historically, longline
vessels have been excluded from fishing in certain regions from time to time. In re-
cent years, troll and handline landings of several pelagic species (e.g., yellowfin)
have declined substantially, while longline landings have increased (Pooley 1994).
Other small commercial, charter, subsistence, and recreational boats operating near-
shore have also been adversely affected.
We examine the impact of the year-round closure of two areas, 20N155W (in-
cluding Oahu and Maui) and 15N155W (including a major part of the fishing areas
close to the Big Island). The results are summarized in table 6. The importance of
the closed areas can be seen from column A in the Baseline Case—for example, in
August, October, and November, more than 50% of the effort was centered on the
Table 4
Monthly Allocation (1995) of Longline Trips, Labor,
and Normalized Crew Wage: Actual vs. Simulated
Allocation of Tripsa
Ratio of
MHIb 5° N – 30° N Labor in Swordfish Normalized
(20N155W Excluding North of Vessel-days Sets Crew Wage
Month  & 15N155W)2 MHI areas 30° N All Areas (VD) (rsw) (NCW)
Actual
January 32.5 47.4 19.2 99.1 1,687 34.3% 1,168
February 17.6 46.5 35.2 99.3 1,913 42.8% 1,182
March 23.7 59.0 19.8 102.5 1,861 45.9% 1,151
April 18.3 79.4 6.8 104.5 2,003 52.6% 683
May 36.3 83.7 0.3 120.3 2,052 52.0% 569
June 22.0 82.3 1.1 105.4 1,971 53.7% 659
July 26.0 55.2 6.4 87.6 1,604 59.6% 348
August 20.7 24.3 16.3 61.3 1,289 52.4% 170
September 12.1 40.5 11.9 64.5 1,225 43.4% 130
October 40.8 39.3 10.2 90.3 1,382 25.5% 450
November 52.8 37.5 21.4 111.7 1,878 30.3% 464
December 16.1 79.5 22.6 118.2 2,047 32.0% 841
Total 318.9 674.6 171.2 1,164.7 20,913 43.3% 651
Simulated
January 21 46 31 98 1,846 35.2% 1,102
February 17 50 32 99 1,863 33.8% 1,043
March 1 61 22 84 1,772 42.9% 1,358
April 3 81 9 93 1,874 54.4% 588
May 32 75 0 107 1,849 65.0% 516
June 27 87 1 115 1,841 68.6% 523
July 18 43 26 87 1,696 36.9% 337
August 34 8 24 66 1,351 32.3% 198
September 24 56 7 87 1,387 0.0% 197
October 61 48 9 118 1,713 0.0% 351
November 64 53 1 118 1,709 0.0% 355
December 1 92 17 110 1,872 18.2% 949
Total 303 700 179 1,182 20,771 31.9% 626
a Actual number of trips was the actual aggregated number of sets divided by 10.
b Main Hawaiian Islands.Chakravorty and Nemoto 194
T
able 5
Catches of Five Species in the Hawaii Longline Fishery During 1995: 


















































































































































































































































Data are in units of standard-size fish.
b 
% Error = [ (simulated catch) – (actual catch) ] / (actual catch).Modeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 195
two closed squares. Column (C – B) in table 6 shows the substitution of vessels into
other areas as a result of area closure. Vessels compensate by fishing in distant wa-
ters, which results in an increase in costs and reduced wages as summarized in table
9. The aggregate number of trips declines. Originally 303 trips were made into the
closed areas, but with the closure policy, only 165 were reallocated, leading to a net
decrease in 138 trips out of the original 1,182 trips—a decline of about 12%.
Conserving Sea Turtles: Closure of the North Fishing Areas North of
Latitude 30° N (Case 2)
Interaction between longline gear and endangered species, such as sea turtles, is
continuously reported in the logbook data (Ito 1995). Leatherback, green sea, log-
gerhead, and olive ridley turtles were reported to have been accidentally caught a to-
tal of 84 times during 1994, although these interactions are widely believed to be
underreported. Kleiber (1998) estimates that approximately 700 sea turtles were
taken, and around 100 were killed in 1995. Most of the loggerhead and leatherback
turtles were caught in areas north of 30° N. Fishery biologists, such as Nitta and
Henderson (1993), have suggested the closure of fishing areas north of 30° N to con-
serve sea turtles, similar to the restrictions imposed in a recent decision by the U.S.
District Court in Hawaii. The impacts of such a policy are simulated in table 7. Un-
like the previous case, turtle conserving policies confine longline vessels to fishing
areas closer to Hawaii; i.e., below 30° N. Since more vessels now fish inshore, travel
days decrease, which, in turn, enables more trips to be taken. Thus, the aggregate
number of trips shows a small increase. The ratio of swordfish sets to the total falls
from 32% to 20%, and swordfish catches, which mostly occur in the high seas, de-
cline significantly (41%), causing normalized crew wages to fall by 9% (table 9).
Table 6
Trip Allocation With and Without Area Closure:
Closure of Two Five-Degree Squares 20N155W and 15N155W
Base Case Area Closure
Closed Other All Other Change in Change in
Areas Areas Areas Areasa Other Areas All Areas
Month (A) (B) (A + B) (C) (C – B) (C – A – B)
January 21 77 98 92 +15 –6
February 17 82 99 93 +11 –6
March 1 83 84 84 +1 0
April 3 90 93 92 +2 –1
May 32 75 107 92 +17 –15
June 27 88 115 106 +18 –9
July 18 69 87 79 +10 –8
August 34 32 66 43 +11 –23
September 24 63 87 75 +12 –12
October 61 57 118 87 +30 –31
November 64 54 118 91 +37 –27
December 1 109 110 110 +1 0
Total 303 879 1,182 1,044 +165 –138
a The number of trips allocated to “closed areas” is zero.Chakravorty and Nemoto 196
Increasing Auction Fee from 10% to 20% (Case 3)
Increasing the auction fee may serve as a mechanism not only to reduce the profit-
ability of fishing and thereby preserve fish stocks, but also as a means of generating
additional revenue for the state. We, thus, examine the impacts of an increase in the
auction fee rate from 10% to 20% (table 8). Since the auction fee is a fixed percent-
age of total revenue before netting variable costs, an increase in the fee results in a
disproportionate negative effect on boats specializing in distant-water fishing whose
variable costs tend to be higher. In particular, trips fishing north of 30° N are signifi-
cantly affected (down by 35 trips), followed by those fishing between 5° N and
30° N, as shown in table 8. Counterintuitively, because of the backward-bending na-
ture of the supply function, a higher auction fee increases the total number of trips
when wages are higher, particularly in the first quarter and in December. Corre-
spondingly, this policy results in fewer fishing trips when labor supply is positively
sloped; i.e., at low-wage levels in the summer and fall (see table 8).
Comparison of the Three Policies
The differential impacts of the three policies on trip allocation, employment, total
revenue (before taxes), government income through taxation, shared costs, profits,
and wages are summarized in table 9. All three policies reduce industry revenue.
The total revenue from all longline trips will decline under all three policies, al-
though the auction fee causes owner and crew incomes to decline significantly (18–
21%). Annual income accruing to vessel owners is simply 50% of the fleet profit di-
vided by the number of active vessels. Thus, boat-owner incomes are most seriously
Table 7
Trip Allocation With and Without Area Closure:
Closure of All Five–Degree Squares North of 30° N
Base Case Area Closure
Closed Other All Other Change in Change in
Areas Areas Areas Areasa Other Areas All Areas
Month (A) (B) (A + B) (C) (C - B) (C - A - B)
January 31 67 98 114 +47 +16
February 32 67 99 112 +45 +13
March 22 62 84 88 +26 +4
April 9 84 93 96 +12 +3
May 0 107 107 107 0 0
June 1 114 115 116 +2 +1
July 26 61 87 98 +37 +11
August 24 42 66 72 +30 +6
September 7 80 87 90 +10 +3
October 9 109 118 121 +12 +3
November 1 117 118 119 +2 +1
December 17 93 110 122 +29 +12
Total 179 1,003 1,182 1,255 +252 +73
a The number of trips allocated to “closed areas” is zero.Modeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 197
affected by auction fees. Sustained low income may cause the net profit to fall be-
low industry long-run average fixed cost, leading to exit from the industry. Some in-
stances of exit from the Hawaii longline fishery to the U.S. Gulf Coast and Fiji have
been observed in recent years (Travis 1999).
Crew incomes per trip are most negatively affected by turtle conservation (11%)
and least by reducing gear conflict. However, this comparison is overstated because
average trip length is shorter under turtle conservation (boats fish closer to shore)
than under gear conflict regulation. Hence, aggregate trips are higher. On the other
hand, crew wages per day are affected more by gear conflict regulation (8%) than by
turtle conservation. However, normalized crew wage, which is net of travel days, is
least affected by gear conflict policies (2%), suggesting that turtle conservation has
more of a negative impact on the crew (down by 9%) than gear conflict policy.
The effect of alternative policies on conservation of fish stocks is also shown in
the table. Interestingly, reduction of gear conflict leads to a significant reduction in
catches for all species other than swordfish, since they dominate harvests close to
port. While turtle conservation leads to a significant reduction of swordfish catches,
it will actually increase catches of bigeye and yellowfin tunas and striped marlin.
Although an auction fee hike will generate more tax revenues and significantly re-
duce fleet profits, the impact on fish conservation is minimal (except for swordfish),
since there is very little substitution of vessels across locations, and the reduction in
the number of trips is relatively small.
Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a spatial and dynamic model of the allocation of fishing effort
that explicitly incorporates the spatial distribution of multiple fish stocks, stock ex-
ternalities from fishing, and the relationship between vessel days and crew wages
normalized across fishing locations. The model is used to simulate the monthly allo-
Table 8
Trip Allocation with Baseline (10%) and Increased (20%) Auction Fee
Base Case Changes From Increasing Auction Fee to 20%
MHIa 5° N – 30° N MHIa 5° N – 30° N
(20N155W Excluding North (20N155W Excluding North
and 2 MHI of All and 2 MHI of All
Month 15N155W) Areas 30° N Areas 15N155W) Areas 30° N Areas
January 21 46 31 98 0 +4 -2 +2
February 17 50 32 99 +2 +4 -3 +3
March 1 61 22 84 +1 +3 0 +4
April 3 81 9 93 +2 +4 -7 -1
May 32 75 0 107 0 -5 0 -5
June 27 87 1 115 -1 -4 0 -5
July 18 43 26 87 +1 -5 -3 -7
August 34 8 24 66 +2 +3 -13 -8
September 24 56 7 87 -3 -6 -3 -12
October 61 48 9 118 -2 -3 -2 -7
November 64 53 1 118 -2 -5 0 -7
December 1 92 17 110 0 +5 -2 +3
Total 303 700 179 1,182 0 -5 -35 -40
a Main Hawaiian Islands.Chakravorty and Nemoto 198
Table 9
Comparison of Alternative Regulatory Policies:  (i) Reducing Gear Conflict,
(ii) Sea Turtle Conservation, and (iii) Increasing Auction Fee
Case 1a Case 2b Case 3c
Baseline Gear Turtle 20%
Case Conflict Conservation Auction Fee
Trips and Effort:
Number of Trips (A) 1,182 1,044 1,255 1,142
(–11.7%) (+6.2%) (–3.4%)
Effort in Vessel-Days (B) 20,771 19,428 19,038 19,700
(–3.6%) (–2.0%) (–5.2%)
Trip Length in Days per Trip (A / B) 17.6 19.2 16.2 17.3
(+9.1%) (–7.7%) (–1.8%)
Ratio of Swordfish Set 31.9% 36.8% 20.0% 26.9%
(+15.5%) (–37.1%) (–15.6%)
Revenue, Costs, and Taxes ($1,000):
Industry Revenue (C) 38,636 35,526 36,024 36,721
(–8.0%) (–6.8%) (–5.0%)
Tax and Fee Revenue (D) 4,057 3,730 3,782 7,528
(–8.0 %) (–6.8%) (+85.6%)
Shared Costs (E) 16,903 16,088 15,495 15,279
(–4.8%) (–8.3%) (–9.6%)
Fleet Profit  (F = C – D – E) 17,677 15,708 16,746 13,914
(–11.1%) (–5.3%) (–21.3%)
Income and Wage ($):
Boat–Owner Income per Vesseld 80,350 71,400 76,119 63,247
      (F x 0.50 / 110) (–11.1%) (–5.3%) (–21.3%)
Crew Income per Trip (F x 0.50 / A) 7,478 7,523 6,672 6,092
(–0.6%) (–10.8%) (–18.5%)
Crew Wage per Day (F x 0.50 / B) 426 392 411 353
(–7.8%) (–3.4%) (–17.0%)
Normalized Crew Wage 628 616 572 514
(–1.9%) (–9.0%) (–18.1%)
Catches (number of pieces):
Swordfish 35,829 36,849 21,042 31,687
(+2.8%) (–41.3%) (–11.6%)
Bigeye Tuna 58,709 49,812 65,326 58,326
(–15.2%) (+11.3%) (–0.7%)
Yellowfin Tuna 20,782 16,883 24,349 20,728
(–18.8%) (+17.2%) (–0.3%)
Albacore Tuna 50,029 46,230 51,000 49,475
(–7.6%) (+1.9%) (–1.1%)
Striped Marlin 25,289 22,527 29,108 24,953
(–10.9%) (+15.1%) (–1.3%)
a Case 1: Two five-degree squares, 20N155W and 15N155W, are closed.
b Case 2: All five-degree squares north of 30° N are closed.
c Case 3: Auction fee is increased from 10% to 20%.
d 50% of the fleet profit divided by the number of active longline vessels (110) in 1995.Modeling the Effects of Area Closure and Tax Policies 199
cation of effort in the Hawaii longline fishery for the year 1995. The impact of regu-
latory decisions, such as inshore (reduction of gear conflict) and offshore (reduction
of turtle bycatch) area closures and taxes on harvest are examined. Inshore area clo-
sure leads to vessels moving to more distant waters. While vessel-owner incomes
decline significantly, the effect on crew income per trip is smaller since they benefit
from taking longer trips. Catches of inshore species are significantly reduced. Off-
shore area closure policies reduce swordfish catches by about 41%. Average trip
lengths decline by about 20%, since boats fish closer to shore. On the positive side,
substitution of boats into inshore areas and an increase in the number of trips allows
for a relatively small adverse impact on fleet profits (5.3%). An increase in the auc-
tion fee on harvest succeeds in skimming profits from the fishery and nearly doubles
tax revenues, but has little effect on conservation of fish stocks.
These results could be useful in assessing the impacts of regulatory policy on
industry groups or on conservation objectives (Wilen 1993). There is an interesting
asymmetry between the two area closure policies: reduction of gear conflict and
turtle conservation. In the first, near-shore area closures lead to fewer trips of longer
duration. The crew continues to receive wages from the increased travel days, but
that does not benefit the boat owners. Thus, inshore area closures have a bigger im-
pact on incomes accruing to boat owners. On the other hand, distant area closures,
such as turtle conservation policies, lead to a larger number of lower-duration trips
and have the opposite effect. Fiscal policy instruments, such as auction fee in-
creases, have a significant effect on both parties because there is limited scope for
substitution, while trips yielding marginal returns are no longer profitable.
The other major impact of turtle conservation is the increased harvesting of
nearshore species such as yellowfin, bigeye, and striped marlin. Although not con-
sidered in the model, this can adversely affect catches by competing fleets, such as
handliners and trollers, as well as recreational vessels. However, nearshore area clo-
sures increase swordfish catches marginally, but have a positive impact on stocks of
competing species.
Our results can be used to compute a rough implicit price of saving a logger-
head turtle. For example, Kleiber (1998) estimates that 66 loggerhead turtles were killed
through interaction with longline gears in 1995. Then using our model results, the rough
cost of adopting turtle conserving policies in terms of foregone profits to the longline
fleet is approximately $14,100 per turtle. These types of implicit valuations can be
used by policymakers to analyze tradeoffs and make appropriate policy decisions.
The model developed in this paper can be improved in several different ways.
The initial fish stock size is estimated based on current catch and hook data, assum-
ing no inflow or outflow within a period but allowing for stock changes across each
period; i.e., between successive months. Possible extensions include incorporating a
migration function that allows for locational stock movements that are a function of
stock differentials between adjacent grids. This function may display seasonal varia-
tions based on biological information on pelagic fish movements.
Improvements in future research could include estimation of the labor supply
function using several years’ data. Additional factors affecting fishery labor supply
(e.g., time lag, income from non-fishing activities) could also be modeled in later
work. The model does not account for interactions with other gear types (e.g.,
handline and troll). For example, a moratorium on distant shore fishing will increase
inshore fishing by longline boats and may increase incidence of gear conflict.
Lastly, the price and catch data used is for the most recent year available (1995),
while the cost data is for 1993. This asymmetry could introduce errors in simulation,
although it is implausible that the cost structure may have changed significantly
within two years. New cost-earnings data from recent NMFS surveys could be used
to further improve the predictive power of the model.Chakravorty and Nemoto 200
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Appendix 1
Calculation of Normalized Crew Wage
Dividing crew income by trip length will yield biased estimates of crew wages,
since both fishing and travel days are included in computation of trip length, and
trips to different locations will entail different travel times. Given the nature of ac-
tivities on board, wages per fishing day are expected to be higher than wages per
travel day. To obtain this relationship, 95 available observations from 1993 trip data
collected by Hamilton, Curtis, and Travis (1996) were used to regress the average
crew income per trip with the average numbers of fishing days and travel days per
trip as:
AW FD TD jj j =− + + 1520 1103 8 309 35
07 2 42 2 22 5
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              (– . )    ( . )             ( . )
(A1)
where AWj, FDj and TDj are the average crew income and numbers of fishing days
and travel days per trip for vessel j, respectively. The above t-ratios suggest that
both parameters were statistically significant at the 5% level. Although the number
of fishing days per trip is fixed in our model, there was some variation on average
number of fishing days in the data. The mean and standard deviation were 10.6 and
2.9, respectively. Since the Breusch-Pagan test rejected the null hypothesis ofChakravorty and Nemoto 202
homoscedasticity, heteroscedasticity was corrected using Shazam econometric com-
puter software (White 1993). The negative intercept, though it is not significant, im-
plies that certain minimum (strictly positive) fishing and travel days are required on
each trip.
The above results imply that the expected wage per travel day is 28.03%
(= 309.35/1103.8) of the wage from a fishing day. Therefore, we remove this bias by
calculating the normalized crew wage (NCW) for a trip to area k as the crew income
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Appendix 2
Estimation of the Ratio of Catchability Coefficients
From equation (11) define X ≡  f(Ek, γ i) = γ i1 Ek1 + γ i2 Ek2. Then the catch function
equation (1), can be expressed as Ci,k = (1 – e–X)Bi,k. Since X is usually between zero











which yields a modified catch function:











where α  is positive and monotonically decreasing with X from a maximum value of
unity. Equation (A5) implies that catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) declines with in-
creased effort due to the stock externality. Catches from tuna (Ci,k1) and swordfish
sets (Ci,k2) in area k can be separated from equation (A4) as:
CB E ik ik ik i k ,, , 1 1 1 =α γ (A6)
CB E ik ik ik i k ,, , 2 2 2 =α γ (A7)
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where CPUEi,k1 = Ci,k1/Ei,k1 is CPUE for species i in area k for the tuna set (similarly
for the swordfish set). In equation (A8), both catchability coefficients (γ i1 and γ i2)
are assumed constant, while CPUE is expected to fluctuate over seasons and vary
across fishing locations. We can now estimate the catchability ratio (γ i2/γ i1) from the
CPUE ratio in equation (A8). Since the noise associated with CPUE data is expected
to be large due to fluctuations in stock size within each month and non-uniformity
of fish stocks within each location (five-by-five degree square), we only use data
points that consist of at least 30 sets each of the tuna and swordfish sets. The result-
ing estimates of the catchability ratio for the five species are presented in table 1.
Okamoto (1999) computed the average CPUE ratios by swordfish and tuna sets and
obtained similar results.
Iterative Procedure of OLS Estimation for Catchability Coefficients
Suppose only one type of fishing strategy is used to catch a single species. Then,
given the catch function, equation (A4), a series of harvests in a fishing location
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where all subscripts denote the time period, and subscripts denoting species, area, and
fishing strategy are omitted for notational simplicity. The net stock inflow during period
t, Rt, is defined as the total fish stock inflow minus the stock outflow and natural mortal-
ity. It is positive if the inflow is greater than the outflow, and vice versa. Note that in
equation (A9), the fish stock changes between periods due to harvest and in- and out-
migration of fish. Expressing the previous equations in terms of CPUEt /α t and subtract-














where CPUEt = Ct/Et is catch-per-unit-effort at period t. To econometrically estimate
γ , we assume that the Hawaii pelagic fishery is in long-run equilibrium; i.e., the ex-
pected net inflow is equal to the expected catch per period in each area. Then rewrit-














where  C  is the average catch per period, Rt = C  + (ε t/γ ) and E(ε t) = 0. Equation
(A11) implies that a change in CPUE adjusted by α  (denoted by ∆ CPUEadj) between
consecutive periods is a negative linear function of catch in the current period. The
long-run equilibrium assumption is supported by Boggs and Ito (1993) and other
studies of the Hawaii pelagic fishery, who report that species abundance estimatedChakravorty and Nemoto 204
by measures such as average CPUE and average weight per fish, has not changed to
any significant degree (WPRFMC 1997).
The estimated parameter γ  in equation (A11) affects the dependent variable,
since α t is a function of γ  and effort level E as in equation (A5). Therefore, we use
an iterative procedure to estimate γ  in equation (A11); i.e., (i) first estimate or guess
γ , (ii) compute α t and ∆ CPUEadj for all observations with this tentative γ , (iii) per-
form another round of estimation with equation (A11) to get the new γ , and (iv) re-
peat the estimation procedure until the estimate of γ  converges.
A panel data set with monthly catch and fishing effort data aggregated for each
five-degree square was used. Data from “swordfish-set-dominant” areas were used
to estimate the catchability coefficient for swordfish with a swordfish set (γ i2), while
data from “tuna-set-dominant” areas were used to estimate the catchability coeffi-
cients for the other four species with a tuna set (γ i1). Results from the final iteration
of the OLS procedure are shown in table A1. All estimated catchability coefficients
were significant at the 1% level with expected signs. The R2 scores were relatively
low, ranging from 0.1761 to 0.3716. This is to be expected because exogenous sea-
sonal (i.e., monthly) fluctuations in the net inflow are accounted for by the error
terms in the model, and pelagic fish abundance in Hawaii is likely to be most
strongly affected by factors other than local fishing activity (Boggs and Ito 1993).
The R2 scores for the three most valuable species (bigeye and yellowfin tunas and
swordfish) were higher than those for albacore and striped marlin, which might re-
flect the relatively greater influence of fishing effort on ∆ CPUEadj. Although the
cross-sectional, time-series data was pooled, neither autocorrelation nor
heteroscedasticity was detected.
Table A1
Results of the Interactive Estimation Procedure for Catchability Coefficients, by Species
Species Set Type Catchability Coefficient Number of
(i)( s)( γ i, s)R 2 Observations
Swordfish Swordfish 0.00483 0.3273 35
(4.46)
Bigeye Tuna Tuna 0.00338 0.3716 55
(5.63)
Yellowfin Tuna Tuna 0.00378 0.3172 55
(4.94)
Albacore Tuna Tuna 0.00431 0.2063 55
(3.45)
Striped Marlin Tuna 0.00248 0.1761 55
(3.24)
Note: Numbers inside the parentheses are t-ratios, which indicate statistical significance at the 0.01
level.